Surviving success : policy reform and the future of industrial pollution in China by Dasgupta, Susmita et al.
\N?5  1I (,
POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  1856
Sur  iv  n  Suc  es  Lax  regulation  of industrial Surviving  Success
pollution is  causing thousands
of premature deaths and
Policy Reform and the Future  serious  health problemsin
of Industrial Pollution  in China  China.  Pollution abatement
would cost little; inactioi i
Susmnita Dasgupta  amounts to valuing a Chinese
Hua Wang  workers  life below US$500,  a
David  Wheeler  tragically low figure by any
standard.
The World Bank  -

















































































































d|  POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  1856
Summary findings
China's recent industrial growth, a remarkable success  thousands of people will die or suffer serious respiratory
story, has been clouded by hundreds of thousands of  damage.
premature deaths and incidents of serious respiratory  Continuing current trends in tightened regulation for
illness caused by exposure to industrial air pollution.  water pollution will lead to sharp improvements;
Seriously contaminated by industrial discharges, many of  adopting an economically feasible policy of much stricter
China's waterways are largely unfit for direct human use.  regulation will restore the health of many waterways.
This damage could be substantially reduced at modest  The stakes are even higher for air pollution because
cost. Industrial reform combined with stricter  regulatory enforcement has weakened in many areas in
environmental regulation has reduced organic water  the past five years. Reversing that trend will save many
pollution in many areas and has curbed the growth of air  lives at extremely modest cost. China's National
pollution. But much higher levels of emissions controls  Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA)  has
(of particulates and sulfur dioxide) are warranted in  recommended a tenfold increase in the air pollution levy;
China's polluted cities.  adopting NEPA's very conservative recommendation
For the cost-benefit analysis that led to this conclusion,  would produce a major turnaround  in most cities. For
the authors developed three scenarios projecting  representative Chinese cities, a fiftyfold increase in the
pollution damage under varying assumptions about  levy is probably warranted economically.
future policies. Their findings:  To be cost-effective, heavy sources of particulate and
Even if regulation is not tightened  further, continued  sulfur dioxide emissions should be targeted for
economic reform should have a powerful effect on  abatement. Reducing emissions from large private plants
pollution intensity. Organic water pollution will stabilize  is so cheap that only significant abatement makes sense
in many areas and actually decline in some. Air pollution  - at least 70 percent abatement of sulfur dioxide
will continue growing in most areas but at a much slower  particulates and even greater abatement of particulates in
pace than industrial output.  large urban industrial facilities.
The cost of inaction would be high: Most of China's
waterways will remain heavily polluted, and many
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China's industrial growth has been extremely rapid during the period of economic reform.
In the 1990s, the output of China's 10 million  industrial enterprises has increased by more
than 15% annually.  Industry is also China's largest productive sector, accounting for
47% of its gross domestic product and employing 17% of the country's total labor force.
As a source of rapidly expanding income, Chinese industry has provided one of strongest
forces lifting many millions of people from poverty.
Unfortunately, serious environmental damage has accompanied this rapid growth.  Many
of China's waterways are close to biological death from excessive discharge of organic
pollutants.  In many urban areas, atmospheric concentrations of pollutants such as
suspended particulates and sulfur dioxide routinely exceed World Health Organization
safety standards by very large margins. As a result, hundreds of thousands of people are
dying or becoming seriously ill from pollution-related respiratory disease each year.
There can be no doubt that Chinese industry is a primary source of this problem.  China's
National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA) estimates that industrial pollution
accounts for over 70% of the national total, including 70% for waste water, including
organic water pollution (COD, or chemical oxygen demand); 72% for sulfur dioxide
(S02)  emissions; 75% for flue dust (a major component of suspended particulates) and
87% for solid wastes.  Many polluting industries are located in densely-populated
metropolitan areas, where emissions exposure causes particularly serious damage to
human health and economic activity.
China's pollution control agencies are aware of these problems, and have responded with
stricter enforcement of regulatory standards for water pollutants.  As a result, many
industrial enterprises have reduced emissions through adoption of end-of-pipe equipment,
process change and materials recycling. Since 1987, provinces which have tightened
enforcement have witnessed a substantial decline in the water pollution intensity, or
pollution per unit of output, of factories which are under regulatory supervision.'
Emissions intensity for some water pollutants has declined so rapidly that total emissions
have fallen despite rapid industrial growth.
Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for industrial air pollution.  The evidence shows
that some regulatory incentives for air pollution control have actually weakened since
1987.  Industrial discharges continue at very high levels, seriously contaminating the
atmosphere of many cities. Figure 1 shows the strong relationship between emissions of
S02 and atmospheric concentrations in fifty-three Chinese cities during the period 1991-
1993.
l  It is important  to note  that  this does  not  include  many  Township  and Village  Industrial  Enterprises
(TVIE's), which are often  highly-polluting  and account  for a major share of China's industrial
production.
2As we will show in this paper,
market reforms have been  _  I another  important  source of  Atmospheric  ~~~Sulfur  Dioxide.  Emissions  andI
another important source of  Atimospheric  Concentration in Chinese Cities, 1991-1993
change in environmental
performance. The reforms
have shifted production away  cn  2.5
from state-owned-enterprises  C  2
and toward larger plants. With
these changes have come  C
substantial increases in  O0
productive efficiency  and  o
decreases in the cost of abating
pollution,  both important  3  3.5  4  4.5  5  5.5  6
sources of declining  pollution  S02 Emissions  (Log)
intensity.  These two factors
may have had as great an
impact on industrial pollution  Figure 1:  S02 Emissions and Air Pollution in Chinese Cities
as changes in direct regulation.
Although the general trend is positive, there remain great regional disparities in industry's
environmental performance. In provinces with stricter regulation and a strong
commitment to economic reform, many industrial facilities have already shown the way to
a cleaner future.  However, the legacy of the past remains strikingly apparent in thousands
of highly-polluting  plants. With industry expected to maintain rapid growth during the
next 20 years, a steep decline in pollution intensity will be necessary  just to keep emissions
constant.
The consequences of current pollution are tragically apparent in public health statistics for
polluted areas.  As we will show, the best available evidence suggests that approximately
4,000 people suffer premature death from pollution-related respiratory illness each year in
Chongqing; 4,000 in Beijing; and 1,000 in both Shanghai and Shenyang. 2 If current trends
persist, we project large cumulative losses in human life through 2020.  Figure 2 illustrates
the grim stakes: Beijing could lose nearly 80,000 people, Chongqing 70,000 and other
major cities could suffer losses in the tens of thousands.
2  These  estimates  are  based  on  the dose-response  relation  established  for atmospheric  S02 in Beijing and
Shenyang  by Xu, et. al. (1994). This relation  is combined  with monitoring  data  on S02 concentrations  to
produce  estimated  individual  probabilities  of premature  mortality  by city.  City-specific  probabilities  are
multiplied by current  population estimates to produce estimated annual deaths.
3In light of other pressing needs,
Lives  Lost to Air Polluton Through  2020  LUder  Present how strongly  should  ChinaCodon
respond to this challenge?  80,000
Environmental  improvements  70,000
are desirable, but pollution  60,000
abatement uses valuable  50,000
economic resources and there  40,000
may be other, less costly,  30,000
health interventions which will  20,000
save lives. Nevertheless, after  10,000
a careful assessment of the  0  _
benefits  and costs, this  paper  m.
will argue that stricter  0X
regulation of air emissions in
heavily-polluted  areas is a very  Figure 2:  Projected Deaths  from  Air Pollution, 1997 -
cost-effective option for public  2020
health improvement. We will also highlight the beneficial effect of recent economic
reforms on public health, through their impact on industrial pollution intensity. Other
compelling arguments for continued modernization of China's economy are bolstered by
its clear environmental benefits.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, we introduce five provinces
which will be used to illustrate the scope of China's industrial pollution problems and the
options for policy reform.  Section 3 draws on several recent research papers to describe
the impact of China's economic reforms and environmental regulations on industrial
pollution since 1987.  In Sections 4 and 5, we explore the implications with several
scenarios for policy reform, pollution reduction, and associated health benefits during the
next two decades.  Section 6 uses our results for a detailed benefit/cost analysis of stricter
air pollution control;  Section 7 considers more general policy implications, and Section 8
concludes the paper.
2. Industrial  Pollution  in China's  Regions
China is continental in scale, with great regional variation in social, economic and
environmental conditions.  To illustrate the implications for environmental policy, we
highlight the experience of five diverse provinces which have serious industrial pollution
problems: Liaoning, Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, and Sichuan (Fig. 3).3 The first four
provinces are scattered from north to south in China's eastern coastal region. Beijing's
industry has a diversity which reflects its status as the nation's political capital.  In
contrast, Liaoning is a traditional center for Chinese heavy industry; many of its factories
have old, highly polluting processes which depend on coal-based energy. Shanghai's
3  In this paper, the term "province"  refers  to provinces,  autonomous  regions and municipalities  which are
directly  affiliated  with  the central  government.
4industrial  base is extremely  |ive Induetrial Regiona
diverse, but its sheer scale assures
a large  potential  pollution
problem. On the other hand,
Shanghai has joined Guangdong as
a center  of China's  economic  i
modernization,  with attendant
benefits  for pollution  reduction.
Guangdong  has its own  particular
interest  for the analysis,  because  Figure  3:  Featured  Provinces
its industrial  development  has
featured  the growth of light
manufacturing  which  operates  at smaller  scale  than China's  average.  Finally,  Sichuan  is
located  in the Red Basin,  in south-central  China. It is considerably  poorer than the other
four  provinces,  and its industry  is highly  pollution-intensive.
Figure  4 displays  income  (consumption)  per capita  in 1988  and 1993: Shanghai  had the
highest  level initially,  and  has bounded  ahead in the period of economic  reform.
Guangdong  and Liaoning  grew more rapidly  than Beijing  during  the five-year  period,
arriving  at near-parity  in 1993. From a much  lower  base, Sichuan  has grown at
approximately  the same  rate as Guangdong  and Liaoning. It remains  the poorest of the
five provinces  by a considerable  margin.
It mnight  seem  logical  for China's  richest  provinces  to be the most highly  polluted,  but
Figure 5 strongly suggests the converse: There
income  Per Capita  (SUS) is an inverse  relationship between industrial
.......  .................. pollution  and economic  development,  most
2500-  strongly  in the case  of air pollution. Sichuan  is
2000  l  ¢  liSS  the clear leader, with both sulfur dioxide (S02)
and total suspended particulate (TSP) emissions
soo  i  |  |  |  a  . exceeding 1,000,000 tons/year in both 1998 and
1993.  Although it has substantially  reduced
}  f  1  S  X  organic  water pollution  (chemical  oxygen
demand - COD) in recent years,  Chongqing
Figure  4: Income  Per  Capita,  1988 and  remains, with Liaoning, the most highly polluted
1993  province in this category as well. Despite its
huge industrial base, Shanghai has far lower pollution loads, while Beijing and Guangdong
are also modest emitters by comparison. 4
4  Analysis  of  air emissions  data  for  all twenty-nine  provinces  reveals  the  same  pattern:  The  poorest
provinces  have  significantly  higher  total  emissions.
5Atmospheric pollution levels reflect these differences in emissions, as suggested by Figure
1.  Figure 6 presents S02
Total  S02 Emissions  concentration  levels  for Beijing,
100o .-.................  .......................  Shanghai, and the major cities of the
other three provinces:  Shenyang
12coo  (Liaoning), Guangzhou (Guangdong)
and Chongqing (Sichuan).  Again,
the highest level by far is observed in
1!2~J  l3  Chongqing. The result is a very large
difference in the risk of death or
serious damage from respiratory
o  . disease, with consequences that have
_  a  =  > =>been  illustrated  in Figure 2.
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Figure  5: Air and  Water  Pollution  Loads,  1988
and 19933  Economic Reform, Regulation and Pollution Reduction Since 1987
3.1 The Basic Economics of Industrial Pollution Control
Figures 2 and 5 reveal great
variation in industrial
emissions and pollution-  Sulfur  Dioxide  Concentrations  (ug/m3)
related mortality across
provinces. As Figure  7  400
suggests,  however,  the  300
differences in emissions are  250
not primarily due to  20.
differences in the scale of
industrial activity. Rather,  =m  ..... m
they reflect differences in  s  6r e  amd  0  =._..
pollution intensity, or
pollution per unit of output:
Industry is 'dirtiest' in
Sichuan, 'cleanest' in
Shanghai; Liaoning and
Guangdong have more  Figure  6: S02 Concentration  Levels,  1992
pollution-intensive  industry than Beijing.  Figure 7 also reveals some remarkable changes
in a very short period of time:  Pollution intensity has fallen sharply since 1988, with
particularly strong and consistent reductions in Guangdong and Sichuan.
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Figure  7a: Provincial  Differences  in
Industrial  Pollution  Intensity
73.2 Key Factors  for Improved  Environmental  Performance
What can account for such
variations? Our recent research has  TSP Intensies,  Chines Provinces
shown  that several  factors  play  0.30  ------------------------------------------------------  - __
important roles in factory managers'  025
abatement decisions: Regulation;
plant and industry  characteristics;  020
and  pressure  applied  by neighboring  0.15  .,1993m
communities (Hettige, Huq, Pargal  0.10
and Wheeler, 1996; Pargal and
Wheeler, 1996). By assessing  005
penalties for non-compliance,  00
regulators raise  the 'price of  . .
polluting' and provide economic
incentives for lowering emissions.
However,  the degree  of response  to  Figure  7b: Provincial  Differences in Industrial Pollution
these incentives varies widely by  Intensity
industry sector, type of ownership, and scale of operations.  There is also strong evidence
that local communities exert independent influence on abatement decisions through
various forms of 'informal' pressure on plant managers (e.g. political leaders, community
leaders, the media).  Richer, better-educated communities seem to operate quite
effectively  through such informal means.
Regulation
In China, national, provincial and local pollution control agencies can affect factory-level
emissions by enforcing the existing emissions standards, pollution levies and other
regulatory instruments.  Penalties for non-compliance raise the 'price of polluting' for
factories and lead to increased pollution control activity. However, our recent research in
China and other Asian countries has shown that the impact of regulation is mediated by
the consistency and strictness of enforcement (Hartman, Huq and Wheeler, 1997; Wang
and Wheeler, 1996). Pollution abatement incurs costs, so the interest of plant managers in
emissions control is highly dependent on the likelihood that non-compliance will be
detected by the authorities.  This, in turn, depends on the monitoring and inspection
resources made available  to local regulators.  Even if non-compliance is detected, the
degree of management responsiveness depends largely on the size of the legally-specified
penalties and the proportion which is actually collected by the authorities.
NEPA's own reports suggest that consistency and strictness of enforcement have varied
greatly across China's provinces (Dasgupta, Huq and Wheeler, 1997). Figure 8 provides
evidence on two comparable measures of regulatory strictness: Actual collections of
pollution levy assessments (or 'effective levies') per unit of excess (above-standard)
8discharge  of wastewater  and  per unit of discharge  for air pollutants. Comparison  with
Figure 7 reveals  a roughly  inverse  relationship  between  ranking  on pollution  intensity  and
ranking  on effective  levies. Beijing  has the highest  effective  levies  and is among  the
lowest  in pollution  intensity;  the converse  is true for Sichuan. In both cases, Guangdong
and Liaoning  are intermediate. Notably,  however,  Shanghai  does not conform  to the
general  pattern: Its effective  air pollution  levy  seems  entirely  out of line, both with its
effective  water pollution  levy  and  its status as the area with lowest  pollution  intensity.
Effective  COD  Levies  }tectve Pir  Pdolion Levies
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Figure  8: Provincial  Differences  in Effective
Regulation
Our research has shown that these variations in effective levies have had significant  effects
on the pollution intensity of production across China's provinces. Each 1% increase in the
effective water pollution levy (from increased levels of legally-defined  penalties or
tightened enforcement) leads to an approximately .8% decrease in COD pollution intensity
(COD per unit of output).  Each 1% increase in
the effective  air discharg,e  levy  leads  to  National
decreases of approximately .3% in S02  LevyLOAFCT
intensity. For the two components  of  /  LCLFCOS
suspended particulates, industrial smoke and  'f^u  A\
dust, reductions in emissions intensity are .8%  Damag
and .4%, respectively, when the effective air 
levy is raised by 1%. It is clear that regulation  \
makes a significant  difference, and that China'  s\/ 
provincial regulators have pursued quite  ,g  *Cmmnty  Capacitv  Eiffective
different regulatory  policies.5 Pollution  Load  *IfornaatioQPrvnca
* Exposed  Population  * Education  rvca
Why do regulators  behave  so differently?  Our  * ncome  *Bargaining  Power  Lv 
research findings are summarized in Figure 9.  Fgr9:SucsoVaitninPvnil
They suggest that two broad sets of factors  Regulation
5  The econometric results are sunmarized  in the Appendix.
9influence regulatory enforcement policy (Afsah, Laplante and Wheeler, 1996).  Local
regulators are apparently responsive to economic factors which influence total damage
assessment. These include the local pollution load, the size of the exposed population, and
local income per capita.  However, effective levies are also affected by differential
community capacity to enforce, which depends on average education, available
information and the power to bargain with local industry.
Cibzen  Environrrental  Corlif  Our results also suggest  that regulators
per  100,000  Inhabtants.  respond  to citizen  complaints,  whose
45  ............................................ incidence  varies  widely  across  provinces
40  ~
$5  ~~~~~~~~~(Dasgupta  and Wheeler, 1996).
30  ~~~~~~~~~~Complaints  per capita  are most strongly
related to average education levels: Areas
15  with high illiteracy are notably 'silent,'
because uneducated citizens are less likely
5
0  i  ~~~~~~~~~to  be aware of environmental problems
and less willing to confront the authorities.
Provincial TSP pollution also has
10 PovinialDiffrencs  i  Citzensignificant  effects on the incidence of
Figure 1:PoicaDifrneinCtzncomplaints.  Figure 10 illustrates the
Complaints  implications of the educational and income
effects for our five provinces:  The incidence of complaints is positively associated with
effective air and water pollution levies, and negatively associated with actual pollution
intensity.  Our evidence suggests that this kind of citizen feedback is a powerful
independent force for environmental improvement.
Plant and Industry Characteristics
Our research has identified three variables in this category which are significant
contributors to pollution intensity in a particular region.  The first, not surprisingly, is the
sectoral composition of industry.  Some industrial processes generate large volumes of
harmiful  pollutants; others do not.  Some sectors also face substantially  higher abatement
costs, increasing the resistance to pollution control in cost-sensitive enterprises.
Scale of operation is also an important determinant of pollution intensity.  In part, this is
because end-of-pipe pollution abatement has very significant scale economies.  Large
plants have lower unit costs of abatement, and respond more readily to regulatory
incentives.  They also tend to be more technically efficient, since their size permits
spreading overhead costs for skilled personnel across many units of production.
Our research also suggests that state-owned enterprises (SOE' s) are substantially more
pollution-intensive  than other plants in China.  The basic cause is apparently lower
operating efficiency,  which affects both abatement costs and the generation of waste
residuals in production.  Recent research in Asian mixed economies has suggested that
SOE's'  insulation from regulation is another contributing factor (Pargal and Wheeler,
101996; Hartman, Huq and Wheeler, 1997). However, our analysis of enforcement practices
in China finds the converse to be true there:  SOE's expenence more, not less rigorous
enforcement (Dasgupta, Huq and Wheeler, 1997). Their greater pollution intensity in
China therefore seems attributable to efficiency  effects alone.
Comparative Significance of Pollution Intensity Factors
Figures 11 and 12 summarize  the  COD IntnsityFactors
Bfect and Significance results of our econometric analysis of  0.c0  ,,,............  .....  ..  .
provincial differences in water and air  0.60
pollution  intensity. The intensity  0.40
0.20
factors  displayed in the Figures  are  ...  R
based on beta coefficients, which  -020  or
measure the direction and relative  .o.  ,
importance of explanatory variables in a
multivariate relationship. For both  .E0  ------
water (COD) and air (S02) pollution  Figure 11:  COD Intensity Factors
intensity, the share of production in
large plants is the most significant
factor in reducing intensity. 6 Its beta-coefficient measure (approximately .60) is
essentially  the same in the two cases.  The share of production in state-owned plants has
large weight as a contributor to pollution intensity, with a beta measure of approximately
.40 in both cases.  The economic incentive for pollution abatement provided by the
pollution levy is also important, although apparently more so for COD pollution.  The
beta coefficient for the effective water levy is approximately .60, while it is in the range
(.20 - .40) for the effective levy on air pollutant discharges.
S02 Into  nsty Factom  Among sectors, the major contributors to
0.4  higher intensity  vary by pollutant. 7 For COD
0.3
0.2  1  .pollution,  the significant  'dirty' sectors  are
o.t  |  |  |  |  | n  n n  Coal Mining,  Building Materials, Transport
0_i  Equipment, Chemicals and Metals.  In the
-0.2  - case of air pollutants, Metals, Petroleum/Gas
-0.4  and Ferrous Metals are exceptionally 'dirty'
4e  _0'  . for S02; Furniture, Metals, Electrical
I ..............................  Equipment, Textiles, Paper, and Ferrous
Figure 12:  S02  Intensity  Factors  Metals  for TSP.
6  The results  for smoke  and dust intensity,  the two components  of TSP intensity,  are similar  to those for
S02.
7  These sectors  are identified  by multivariate  analysis,  in which  exceptionally  'clean' or 'dirty' sectors  are
those  which  depart  significantly  from average  pollution  intensities  after the effects  of the levy,  scale  and
ownership  are accounted  for.
113.3  The Reform Experience Since 1987
China's economic reforms during the past  Output  Share  of  Large  Plants
decade have focused on increasing the role
of price signals in the economy, reducing  Q5
constraints on enterprise expansion (and  0.50
contraction), reducing the role of SOE's,  0.40
and reducing trade protection.  The results  0.3S  |  [  *'
have included extremely rapid industrial  02
growth and major changes in economic  0l20
structure.  The reforms have also had a  a010
major impact on industrial pollution,  c
because they have affected the sectoral  .
composition of output, the size distribution  _
of Chinese factories, their ownership, and  Figure  13: Industrial  Output  Shares  for Large
their sensitivity  to economic incentives  Plants
provided by the pollution levies.
Plant Scale
Output  Shanre  oStte.Owned  Plants
To illustrate the impact of the reforms on
industrial  pollution,  we begin with  plant  scale.
Figure 13 portrays total industrial output shares  0.70
for large plants in our five provinces.  There is  0z987]
a clear, consistent pattern of increase in plant  00  J
scale during the period 1988-1993, which is  0
most pronounced  for Shanghai.  Our analysis  030
has shown that this increase in scale has been  0.20
accompanied by a substantial decline in
pollution intensity. 8
Figure  14: Output  Shares  for SOE's
Ownership
Across our five provinces, Figure 14 shows that there has been a large decline in the
output share from SOE's during the reform period.  The decline is most pronounced in
Shanghai and Guangdong.  Our econometric results suggest that the decline in SOE share
has been accompanied by a significant  decline in pollution intensity.
8 These  results  are  representative  of changes  in China  as a whole.  See  Wang  and  Wheeler  (1996)  for an
analysis  of  changes  in industrial  water  pollution  across  all of China's  provinces.
12Sectoral Change
Figures 15 and 16 provide information on
High-COD  Sectors  the share of production in 'dirty' sectors
Q40  ........................  across  our five  provinces,  and  for China
a3  x  - . as a whole. For China,  only S02-
0Q30  | | |  .intensive  sectors  have exhibited  a
025  L  significant drop in share since 1987.  In
020  | 111  |  | |  |  li  |  |  . 1:1  our five provinces,  however,  the reforms
Q15  E  | ll  |  |  lll  |  IIIIF  1lg  . have  had a more general 'clean' effect.
The dirty sector share drops in all cases
o_x  for water pollution  and  in all but one case
i  c  0  X  (S02 in Liaoning)  for air  pollution.  The
m~  g  O  m  Clargest  changes have occurred in Beijing
for COD-intensive sectors, and in
Figure 15:  Production Share of COD-Intensive  Guangdong  and  Shanghai  for both S02-
Sectors  and TSP-intensive sectors.
High-TSP  Sectors  High-S02 Sectors
0.45...7
0.050









Figare  16: Production  Share  of S02-and  TSP-
Intensive Sectors
Trade  Liberalization
China has opened its frontiers to more trade as the economic reforms have proceeded.
From an analytical  perspective, the impact of trade liberalization on the environment could
be either positive or negative. Positive effects include enhanced production efficiency  in
export-oriented enterprises and more rapid absorption of newer, cleaner technologies from
OECD sources. 9 On the other hand, China's comparative advantage could be in pollution-
intensive industries because it has weaker environmental regulation and lower-cost heavy
raw materials than many of its trading partners. We have checked for this possibility by
9 Huq, Martin, and Wheeler (1993) have found that more open developing economies absorb clean
technologies in metals and paper production much more rapidly than their less open counterparts.
13Share of Polluting  Sectors:
Chinese Industy,  17l-1992  analyzing  recent  trends  for the five most
0.8  . . .heavily-polluting  industry  sectors:'
0.75  <  . Chemicals,  Pulp and Paper,  Non-Ferrous
Metals,  Ferrous  Metals,  and  Non-Metallic
Minerals  (principally  Cement). Using
0.65  \<\  >  . production  and  trade data for China  and its
0.6  V  . trading  partners,  we have  developed  three
0.55.  _  indices  of change  in  pollution  intensity.
r  j  g  8  e  i  z>88|c 
IFigure_17__Trend_in_the_Output_Share_of_th  Five  The first is the proportion  of China's  total
Figure  17: Trend  in the Output  Share  of the Five  industrial output produced  by these five
sectors during  the era of reform. Figure
Net  Imports  of  Polluting  Products  17 provides  the evidence: From 1977  to
25  -----  .. _-  --------------------  1992,  the output share  ofthe five 'dirty'
20  r  '  sectors  has trended downward. Within
.5  /  the period,  rapid  decline  in the early 1980's  was succeeded  by an increase  in
10  g  the late 1980's  and a leveling  off  in the
5  . early 1990s. There  is no evidence  of any
1.2  1long-run  shift  toward a pollution-intensive
15987  Is"  199  1990  19,91  19,92  1993  1994  industry  structure.
Figure 18: Trend in Net Imports from Pollution-
Intensive  Industries  Our second  index  is the trend in net
imports  (imports  minus  exports)  of
ConsumptlonlProducUon  of  Pollutng  Products  products  from  the five  heavily-polluting
sectors.  If China's  comparative
advantage is really in pollution-intensive
industries,  then the era of trade
liberalization  should  be witnessing  a shift
toward net exports of their products. In
fact, Figure 18 shows  that the opposite
_.04.  _  has occurred: Real net imports  of these
1987  198W  1989  1990  1991  1992  products  have  trended  strongly  upward
Figure 19: Consumption/Production  for the Output  since  1987.
of Pollution-Intensive  Industries  Finally, we have used the available data
to calculate  China's
consumption/production  ratio for the output of the five dirty  sectors.  If China's
comparative  advantage  lies  in 'dirty' production,  then  two things  should  be true. First,
this ratio should  be less  than one, since  China  should  be a net exporter of pollution-
intensive  goods. Secondly,  the ratio should  fall over time because  production  for export
should  increase  faster  than production  for domestic  consumption. The evidence  is Figure
19 is mixed,  but is not generally  consistent  with the hypothesis  that China's  comparative
advantage  is in pollution-intensive  production. The series  has a modest  downward  trend
10  See  Hettige, et. al. (1995)  and Mani and Wheeler  (1997) for detailed  information  on pollution
intensities  by sector.
14for the period since 1987. However, the consumption/production ratio has remained well
above one throughout the period.  This supports the story in Figure 18: China has been
and remains a net importer  of pollution-intensive  goods from its trading partners.
Overall, the evidence seems clear: China's revealed comparative advantage in the era of
trade liberalization has been in non-pollution-intensive  goods.  Of course, all industries
have experienced rapid growth during the past ten years, including pollution-intensive
ones.  Their cleaner counterparts have simply  grown faster, both in the domestic sphere
and in China's international trade.  The comparative advantage effect of trade
liberalization  has therefore reinforced its positive impact on efficiency  and absorption of
clean technology.  For China, increasing openness seems to have had a generally 'clean'
impact on the sectoral composition of industrial output.
3.4 Regulation, Pollution Abatement and Industrial Migration
Our research has identified the effective pollution levy as a powerful instrument for
inducing emissions reduction by Chinese industry. 11 Pollution intensity is significantly
lower in provinces with higher effective levies, and it is falling in provinces where the
levies are rising. However, China's recent history suggests that commitment to stricter
regulation has been mixed at best.  Despite the clearly damaging levels of air pollution
revealed by Figure 6, real effective air pollution levies have actually fallen since 1987 in all
five of our focal provinces.  The decline is particularly striking in Beijing and Shanghai.
Real effective water pollution levies have also fallen in these cities, while they have risen
sharply in Liaoning and Guangdong (and more modestly in Sichuan).
The Impact of Regulation
Industrial air and water pollution intensity have declined in all five provinces, but at very
different rates.  To interpret these variations, it is useful to combine the evidence in
Figures 7 and 8.  For both air and water pollution, declining real levies in Beijing and
Shanghai  have produced incentives for increased pollution intensity.  The observed
declines in intensity are therefore attributable to countervailing shifts in scale, ownership
and sectoral composition induced by the economic reforms.  For air pollution intensity, the
same conclusion follows for Liaoning, Guangdong and Sichuan: The decline is due to the
structural impact of reform, because the air pollution levy has actually fallen in real terms.
In the case of water pollution, on the other hand, there has been a sharp drop in intensity
in these three provinces because the two factors have reinforced one another:  Effective
water pollution levies have risen substantially,  and the structural impact of reforms has
been strongly pollution-reducing.
"  See  Wang and Wheeler  (1996)  and the Appendix  for evidence  on the water pollution  levy.
Corresponding  evidence  for  the air pollution  levy  is provided  in the Appendix.
15Migration  of Dirty  Sectors  Within China?
In the previous  section,  we established  that trade reforms  have  not had a 'dirty-sector'  bias
during  the past decade. However,  it is at least possible  that internal  differences  in
regulatory  strictness  could  have  induced  relocation  of dirty  industry  within  China.
Despite  the evident  trend toward equalization  of the effective  levy  in the eastern
provinces,  Figure  8 includes  differences  as great as 3:1 in levy  rates. Lucas (1996)  has
recently  investigated  whether  such  differences  have  induced  faster  growth of pollution-
intensive  sectors  in provinces  with laxer regulation. His results suggest  that differential
levies  are not significant  as location  factors,  so there has apparently  been  no regulation-
induced  migration  of dirty  sectors  within  China. 
12
Economic  Reform  and The Cost of Abatement
In recent  econometric  research,  we have  (20a)
used plant-level  data from  NEPA  to  Pariculate Marginal  Abatement  Costs. Large  Plants
develop  detailed  estimates  of abatement  70  .
costs for air and  water emissions  by  s0o/
Chinese industry (Appendix; Dasgupta,
Huq, Wheeler and Zhang, 1996). Our  I  i
results show that marginal abatement costs  20  -
(MAC) vary greatly by sector, scale,  10
abatement rate, ownership, and pollutant.  o ,  O  :  :
The  impact  of these  variables  on marginal  R  of AbY ... e
cost is dramatically illustrated by a few  Figure  20: Marginal  Abatement  Costs  for
comparisons.  Holding  other factors  Chinese  Industry
constant,  MAC  ratios can  vary as much  as
20:1 between  large and small  facilities;  45:1  (20b)
across  sectors; 13:1  between  10% and 90%  Partculate  Marginal  Abatement  Costs Small  Plants
abatement;  5:1 between  state-owned  plants  1400 .
12D0- (SOE's) and non-SOE's; and 4:1 across
pollutants. The range of potential  variation  XsINSOE
is revealed  by the comparative  MAC  /
400 schedules in Figure 20.  In the case of  200
particulates  (20(a)-(b)),  MAC  for large, non-  0  .t.  -___4>-  _  _*--  ___  __
SOE plants is barely above $10/ton at 90%  MaOe.  0  0  0  t  a
abatement.  By contrast,  large SOE facilities
reach  the same  MAC  at 40% abatement  and
increase  to $70/ton  at 90%. For small  plants,  MAC's for particulates  increase  by an order
of magnitude  in both cases: to over $200/ton  for non-SOE's and $1,400/ton  for SOE's.
12  See Lucas (1996).
16Figures 2Q0(c)-(d)  tell the same relative story for S02 abatement, but the MAC schedules
shift upward by half an order of magnitude. At 90% abatement, MAC's are approximately
$50/ton for large, non-SOE plants; $280/ton for large SOE's; $1,000/ton for small  non-
SOE's; and $5,500/ton for small SOE's.
(20c)  (20d)
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These dramatic differences highlight the beneficial impact of economic reform on China's
prospects for industrial pollution control.  As an increasing share of industrial production
moves toward large non-SOE plants, the marginal cost of abatement for the industrial
system is falling significantly. Our results suggest that the marginal cost of abatement is
now substantially  lower (in real terms) than it was in 1987.
3.5 The Role of  Local Communities
During the era of reform, incomes have risen rapidly across China (Figure 4) and literacy
rates have continued to improve.  Our research on regulation in China suggests that these
developments have also had a significant  effect on industrial water pollution.  As local
communities have become wealthier and better-educated, three forces for declining
pollution intensity have been strengthened. First, increased community income and
education push the water levy rates upward as provincial  regulators adjust their
enforcement policy to improved conditions and higher valuation of environmental benefits.
Secondly,  feedback through citizen environmental complaints increases, with amplifying
effects on enforcement. Finally, rising income and education strengthen 'informal
regulation,' as communities  with more resources and greater interest in environmental
protection increase pressure for abatement through a variety of political and social
channels.
While the link between socioeconomic development and effective water pollution levies
seems clear, we have found no equivalent empirical  relationship between development and
effective air pollution levies. This is unfortunate, because the evidence suggests that air
pollution, not water pollution, is the major source of damage to human health in China. In
fact, our evidence shows that real air pollution levies have been declining all over China
during a period of rapid growth and otherwise-progressive change.  The implication  is
clear and sobering: Nothing in the Chinese system will automatically guarantee stricter
17regulation of air pollution as the economy advances.  If current trends continue, many
thousands of lives will be lost to air pollution in China's industrial centers.
To summarize, several factors have strongly affected industry's environmental
performance in China during the past decade. For China's environmental regulators,
important policy options are identified by the direct impact of regulation on emissions and
the use of public environmental information to bolster informal regulation by local
communities. National and provincial economic reforms also have a major impact on
polluters' behavior and abatement costs, through their effects on the sectoral growth rates,
plant ownership and scale of operations.  Finally,  more general economic development
policies influence  industry's environmental  performance in the long run by increasing
community incomes, education levels, and bargaining power.  These feed back into
regulation, both formally (through citizen complaints and the enforcement policy of
regulators) and 'informally' (through increased pressure on plants from local
communities).
4.  Designing Future Pollution Scenarios
4.1 The Past as Prelude
Our review of recent Chinese experience with industrial pollution shows that significant
progress in abatement is possible. In cases where regulatory incentives  to abate have
complemented the progressive impact of economic reforms, there have been rapid declines
in the pollution intensity of production - so rapid, in fact, that total water pollution loads
from regulated industries have actually fallen.  13  But in many cases, particularly for
hazardous air pollution, the recent trend in regulatory incentives has been perverse:
Effective levies have declined significantly,  producing an inducement to higher pollution
intensity which has canceled much of the impact of the reforms.  Furthermore, the reforms
themselves will inevitably run their course:  Increases in the output shares of large and
non-SOE factories are naturally self-limiting. While the reforms have certainly 'bought
time' for China, the future spotlight must shift to the prospects for tighter regulation.  If
abatement incentives aren't adjusted, industrial pollution intensities, pollution loads and
contamination of the ambient environment  will almost certainly increase. Given China's
current industrial growth rate, the consequences for public health could be severe.  In this
section, we use our econometric results to project the consequences of alternative policy
strategies for China's environmental future.
13 It is less  clear  that overall  loads  from  industry  have  fallen,  because  much  production  in rapidly-growing
TVIE's  is apparently  not covered  by  the  traditional  regulatory  system. The  evidence  for  TVIE's  is
extremely  scanty,  and  research  on  the  environmental  performance  of  TVIE's  is clearly  a top  priority  for
future work.
184.2  Projecting the Pollution Impact of Alternative Policies
China affords a unique opportunity for projection of alternative futures, because for many
parts of China the future already exists.  As Figures 8, 13 and 14 indicate, China's
provinces and major urban areas exhibit great disparity in the present strictness of
environmental regulation, the share of production in large enterprises, and the degree of
state ownership of industry.  Shanghai,  for example, has a high proportion of production
in large facilities, a low proportion in state enterprises, a high (although unfortunately,
falling) degree of regulatory strictness and, as a result, low levels of pollution intensity per
unit of industrial output.  Sichuan's statistics are the converse in most cases.
For much of China, it will be many years before current conditions in Shanghai are
replicated.  Thus, although we cannot predict the future path of technological progress
with any accuracy, we can develop conservative projections for much of China based on
actual conditions in the more advanced provinces. And even among the latter, there is
sufficient diversity of characteristics to permit use of econometrically-estimated
relationships to estimate the consequences of moving toward leading-edge status in the
dimensions  which matter most for pollution intensity.
China's second advantage is its wealth of data.  Large databases made available to us by
NEPA have enabled us to base our entire forecasting exercise on the econometric
estimation exercises summarized  in this paper.  To our knowledge this has not previously
been possible, in China or any other country. We have used the NEPA databases in three
related studies: (1) determinants of industrial air and water pollution intensity; (2) the
impact of air emissions on atmospheric pollutant concentrations; and (3) the cost of
pollution abatement. For our air pollution scenarios, we have completed the forecasting
exercise by joining our estimates to the empirical findings of Xu. et. al. (1994) on the
health impact of air pollution.
4.3  Projecting Pollution Damage
Emissions Intensities and Loads
Our analysis  begins with projections of industrial pollution loads, which are based on our
econometric studies of variations in pollution intensity for COD, S02  and TSP.  Figures
11 and 12 summarize the significant  intensity factors:  The effective pollution levy; large
plant share of output; SOE share of output; and the shares of exceptionally 'clean' and
'dirty'  sectors.  Assuming that the economic reforms will continue, we have extrapolated
from recent trends in these variables to project their future paths.
We treat the effective pollution levy as a policy variable in three scenarios: (1) Holding the
air and water pollution levies constant at their 1993 levels, which would represent regress
for water but progress for air (in light of the decline since 1987); (2) an annual increase of
5%/year, which would be approximately reflect the recent national trend for water
19pollution levy rates and a considerable reversal of trend for air pollution; (3) an annual
increase in 10% per year, representing a much stronger commitment to pollution control.'4
We combine these three levy scenarios with projected changes in sector, output scale and
ownership to generate projected paths for industrial COD, S02 and TSP intensity for
China as a whole, and for the major cities in our five focal provinces: Beijing, Shanghai,
Shenyang (Liaoning), Guangzhou (Guangdong), and Chongqing (Sichuan).  These are
combined with exogenously-projected changes in total industrial output to produce
estimates of future air and water pollution loads. 5
Ambient Concentration
We use the econometric results illustrated in Figure 1 to project the consequences of
changing air pollution loads for ambient concentrations of S02.16 Controlling for
precipitation, the estimated elasticity linking load to concentration is approximately .51:
A 1% increase in S02 emissions density (or emissions per unit area) in a particular city
increases its atmospheric concentration by .51%. We use this elasticity and the projected
air emissions change in each city to project future atmospheric concentrations. We have
not been able to replicate the exercise for suspended particulates or water pollution,
because supporting data are not available.
Health Damage
The next link in the analytical chain requires estimation of the change in mortality which is
induced by a change in atmospheric S02 concentration. For this exercise, we rely on
recent empirical studies in Beijing and Shenyang by Xu, et. al. (1994).  They have
estimated 'dose-response' relationships linking atmospheric concentrations of TSP and
S02 to respiratory disease in the two cities. They find the strongest relationship between
mortality and ambient S02 concentration, but with high variability: Mortality responds
much more strongly to S02  concentration change in Beijing than in Shenyang. For these
two cities, we have projected health risks using the dose-response parameters estimated by
Xu's team.  For the other three cities, we have used the average of the two parameter
values. In each case, we have estimated mortality risks from projected atmospheric S02
concentrations, and combined the risk estimates with projected city populations to
forecast changes in mortality from respiratory illness.
Our projections focus on S02 concentrations because Xu's study shows that they are
highly correlated with damage from respiratory disease. Recent scientific evidence
provides some insight into the nature of this relationship.  Sulfur dioxide and other oxides
14  NEPA  has  recently  recommended  a tenfold  increase  in the air  pollution  levy  rate,  which  would  be in
the same  range  as our 10%  annual  increase  scenario.
15  We  assume  that growth  rates  of  pollution  loads  for the  five  cities  are  the  same  as the  projected  rates  for
their  provinces.  For  Beijing  and Shanghai,  this is a tautology.  The  assumption  seems  quite  reasonable  in
the other  cases,  since  the  three  cities  are  the  primary  industrial  regions  of  their  respective  provinces.
16  Full econometric  results  are  reported  in the  Appendix.
20of sulfur  combine  with oxygen  to form sulfates,  and,with  water vapor  to form aerosols  of
sulfurous  and sulfuric  acid. These acid  mists  can irritate  the respiratory  systems  of humans
and animals.  Therefore,  a high concentration  of S02 can affect  breathing,  and may
aggravate  existing  respiratory  and cardiovascular  disease. Sensitive  populations  include
asthmatics,  individuals  with bronchitis  or emphysema,  children,  and the elderly.
The second,  and  probably  more  significant,  effect  of S02 is traceable  to the impact  of fine
particulates  on mortality  and morbidity.  A review  of recent evidence  by the US
Environmental  Protection  Agency suggests  that fine particulates  are the source of the
worst health  damage  from air  pollution. In the case  of China,  there is reason to believe
that 30-40%  of fine particulates  are in the form of sulfates  from S02 emissions.
While  Xu's results  and the available  data have  led us to focus on S02, we also  recognize
the potential  contribution  of total suspended  particulates  (TSP)  to atmospheric
concentrations  of fine particulates  (FP). For Beijing  and Shenyang,  we interpret  Xu's
weak  results  for TSP to mean  that measured  total suspended  particulates  in those cities  do
not have  a substantial  FP component.  Nevertheless,  we recognize  that this may  not be
true in other cases. Therefore,  our policy  scenarios  include  projections  for industrial  TSP
emissions,  both for China  as a whole and  for our five cities.
4.4 Projecting  Abatement  Costs
Abatement  costs are projected  from our econometric  analyses  of Chinese  factory  data for
several  air and  water pollutants. The major determinants  are pollutant  type; industry
sector;  ownership;  scale of abatement  activity  (related  to the volume  of discharge);
pollutant  concentration  in the waste stream;  and degree  of abatement  (or percent
reduction  in pollutant  concentration). At the city  level,  we use our results  to project
incremental  costs  for degrees  of abatement  ranging  from 10%  to 90%.
Data on fine particulate  emissions  are not available,  so we have  used S02 as a proxy
because  S02 emissions  have a significant  fine particulate  content. However,  as Figure  20
shows,  S02 reduction  is considerably  more expensive  than abatement  of particulates.  To
avoid  severe  bias  in our benefit/cost  assessment,  we therefore  consider  the costs of air
pollution  abatement  for both S02 and  particulates.  We recognize  that our analysis
understates  the benefits  of direct  removal  of fine  particulates,  since  these  represent  only a
part of total volume  for S02.  In any  case, our results  provide  an extremely  strong
benefit/cost  rationale  for air pollution  abatement.
215.  Policy  Choices  and Environmental  Consequences:  Scenarios  for Five Cities
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Figure  21: Changing  Shares  for Pollution-Intensive  future environmental conditions. To
Sectors,  1988-2020  provide overall perspective, we also
include projected pollution intensities
and loads for China as a whole.
5.1  Trends in Pollution Intensity Factors
In the first stage of the analysis,  we use
recent trends to project future levels of
non-regulatory determinants of pollution
intensity (pollution per unit of output) for  )12  .
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increase very slightly,  from 32% to 32.8%.
While only the S02-related changes
appear significant at the national level,
Figure 21 suggests increasing diversity in  Output  Share of TSP-Intensive Sectors
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shares  but a falling  S02-intensive  share.  Figure  21: Changing  Shares  for Pollution-Intensive
Although these impacts are unintentional,  Sectors,  1988-2020
they are part of 'business as usual' under
the reform.  On this margin, provinces
22with a rising  share of pollution-intensive  output will carry  a heavier  regulatory  burden  than
those with a falling  share. The environmental  impact  of changing  shares  is reflected  in our
projections.
Recent  trends suggest  less diversity  in the movement  toward concentration  of production
in large  plants.  Shares  in all five cities  are trending  upward at about  the same  rate, so the
projected  distribution  across  provinces  in 2020 has a spread  similar  to the current  one.
Cities  in the northeast  group (Beijing,  Shanghai,  Shenyang)  are tightly  clustered  around
one path; Guangzhou  and Chongqing  around another. Figures  22 (a-b) display  a striking
22(a)  22(b)
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increase  in projected  shares: For China  as a whole,  the large-plant  share  increases  from
30% to 58%  during  the period 1988-2020.  Across  provinces,  the minimum  large-plant
share  rises  from 22% to 49% (Guangdong),  while  the maximum  increases  from 48% to
70% (Beijing). While  they  forecast  large changes,  our projections  are mostly  within  the
range of current  experience.
For state ownership,  the projections  illustrated  in Figure  22 (a-c) show a continued  sharp
decline  at the national  level,  but a more mixed  experience  across  provinces. Extrapolation
from  recent  trends yields  a projected
national  decline  in SOE share  from 58%  (22c)
to 43% during  the period 1988-2020.  Ou  Share  of  Slh*fd  lars
Beijing,  Shanghai  and Chongqing  o.-......
experience  a similar  decline  in SOE  Q  +
share: From around  70% in  1988  to  (I  *D..--  ......  ,
around 40% in 2020.  Guangzhou  0.40
preserves  its status  as a strong  non-SOE  O.  .........
'outlier,' declining  from an already-low  0.10  I
SOE share of 45% in 1988 to around  1s  1194  mm  zno  z)
15%  in 2020.  Shenyang,  on the other
hand,  had an actual  increase  in SOE
share  during 1988-1994.  While  we do
not expect  this to continue,  we have no evidence  to support a projection  of declining  SOE
17  As previously  noted,  the 'pollution  intensive'  sectors  in this analysis  are  the sectors  with large 'dirty'
or 'clean'  residual  effects  after  size,  ownership  and  provincial  pollution  levies  are  accounted  for.
23share in Shenyang. We therefore assume that it will remain stable at its current level -
perhaps overly conservative, but consistent with our approach for other cities.
5.2  Industrial Production
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Figure  23: Industrial  Output  Trends,  1988-2020  slacken  somewhat  in the early  twenty-
first century. Again, an analysis of
regional trends reveals considerable
diversity within China (Figure 23).  Shanghai's industrial economy is already huge, and its
economy is shifting  rapidly toward the service sector at the margin.  Extrapolating from
the trend during 1988-1994, we project a 4.1% annual growth rate for Shanghai's industry
through 2020; an overall increase of about 180% during the forecasting period.
Guangdong has a projected industrial growth rate of 5.7% and an overall increase of
320%.  Beijing and Liaoning are intermediate, with annual growth rates near 5% and
overall increases of around 250%.  The contrast between the coastal regions and the
interior is evident in Sichuan's trend output growth.  Although our projection (3.5%
annual; 150% overall) would be respectable for many economies, it is clearly lagging by
comparison with the coastal provinces.
Of course, these simple extrapolations cannot fully  anticipate the dynamics of regional
change during the next two decades.  It is entirely possible that congestion and rising
factor costs in the coastal region will reduce its comparative advantage for industrial
location, leading to a shift toward interior locations.  However, agglomeration economies
are powerful and the coastal region is China's entrepot for international trade.  On
balance, extrapolations from recent trends seem to yield reasonable predictions.
5.3  Economic Reform and Environmental Regulation:  Possible Futures
Prospects for 'Win-Win': Economic Reform Without Stricter Regulation
China's economic reforms have generated powerful forces for reduced pollution intensity
in manufacturing. The consolidation of production in large plants has lowered pollution
intensity, because unit abatement costs and generation of waste residuals are lower in large
facilities. Non-SOE factories have absorbed a growing share of industrial output,
producing further reductions in pollution intensity from efficiency  gains.  Our econometric
analysis suggests that these factors have accounted for much of the decline in air and
24water pollution  intensity  across  China's  provinces  since 1987. The experience  of
regulation  has been  more mixed: Higher  air- and  water-pollution  levies  have significantly
reduced  pollution  intensity,  but real effective  air levies  have actually  fallen  in all five focal
provinces  since  1987  and the water levies  have fallen  in Beijing  and Shanghai.
The results  have  been equally  mixed. In Guangdong,  where  increases  in the water levy
have  reinforced  the impact  of reform  (including  a decline  in the share  of COD-intensive
sectors),  there has been a very sharp  decline  in water pollution  intensity. In Beijing,  by
contrast,  the effective  air pollution  levy  has fallen  substantially  while  the share  of S02-and
TSP-intensive  sectors  has risen. These changes  have  partly counteracted  the impact  of the
reforms,  and  industrial  S02- and TSP-intensities  have  declined  modestly  while  production
scale  has risen  rapidly.
What  would  happen  in the future if the reforms  continued  but regulation  wasn't tightened?
To explore  this possibility,  we have combined  our econometrically-estimated  intensity
equations  for COD,  S02 and TSP  with projected  changes  in pollution  intensity  factors
(sector,  scale, ownership),  while  holding  air and water pollution  levies  at 1993  levels  for
each  province. This  is equivalent  to projecting  the environmental  consequences  of
continued  economic  reform  alone,  with no contribution  from stricter  regulation. We term
this  the 'win-win' scenario  because  economic  reform  is already  presumed  to be beneficial
on other grounds. Its impact  on pollution  intensity  provides  a net environmental  gain
without any  cost explicitly  incurred  for pollution  control.
Tightening Regulation:  Two Scenarios
Tightening  regulation  will provide  explicit  incentives  to reduce  pollution  intensity,  which
will complement  the impact  of economic  reform. To explore  the implications  of different
strategies,  we have  developed  two scenarios:  In the first, air and  water pollution  levies  are
both increased  by 5% annually.  This leads  to a fourfold  increase  in the real levy  by 2020.
A second scenario  increases  levies  by 10%  annually,  leading  to a thirteenfold  increase  by
2020.
Water Pollution
Industrial COD Loads in China
Comparative  forecasts  for total  .........  -
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as a whole  and by city  in Figure  24.  .0  Reform
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from 8.3 million  tons annually  to 9.8  Figure  24: COD  Loads  in Three  Scenarios
million  tons, during  a period of
rapid  industrial  growth. In three of the five cities  - Shanghai,  Guangzhou  and Shenyang  --
25projected changes in sectoral composition, scale and ownership are sufficient to maintain
or reduce total COD loads.  For two cities - Beijing and Chongqing - COD discharges
increase, but at a far slower rate than industrial output.
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Figure 24:  COD Loads in Three Scenarios
(cont'd)
Our first (5%) levy scenario reflects a continuation of recent trends in water pollution
regulation. The results for China are very encouraging: a projected reduction from 8.3
million  tons to 3.3 million  tons.  In the five cities, a fourfold increase in the effective levy
(coupled with the reforms) induces a COD load reduction of 66%.  This amounts to over
120,000 tons annually in Shanghai alone.  The imposition of a 10% annual increase in the
levy leads to a fall in emissions from 8.3 million  tons to 1.1 million tons nationally and
88% reductions for the five cities:  160,000 tons annually in Shanghai, 145,000 in Beijing;
60,000 in Chongqing, 55,000 in Guangzhou and 21,000 in Shenyang.
All  three scenarios  lead  us to an optimistic  view  Oao  /lfloLebn  *
of  the potential for solving China's industrial
water pollution problem, at least in the case of  ;  . _
COD.  The  best  available  evidence  suggests  SU  ...
that total  COD loads will increase  only  man  A.  awva
modestly as economic reform proceeds, even if  X G*h.
regulations  are not tightened.  Moreover,  the  Chm-g*0
projected results of higher pollution levies are  0o
quite striking. We project that a 10% annual
increase in the levy through 2020 would  Figure  24:  COD Loads  in Three Scenarios
eliminate most of the COD emissions from
regulated factories in China.
Air Pollution
For TSP and S02, we project national and city emissions using the same approach:
*  We use projected pollution levies and shares of large plants, SOE's,  'dirty' sectors and
'clean' sectors to project national and provincial pollution intensities. We assume that
26provincial intensities are the same as the pollution intensities of our focal cities (not an
unreasonable assumption, since these cities are the main industrial centers of their
provinces and, in two cases (Beijing and Shanghai) are identical to the provinces).
*  To estimate city emissions, we multiply projected provincial industrial output by the
city's share of provincial industrial output in 1993. Thus, we assume (again, not
unreasonably) that the growth of industry in the province's main industrial city will be
identical to the growth of industry in the province.
*  To obtain total projected TSP and S02 loads for China and the five cities, we multiply
projected pollution intensities by projected industrial outputs.
For S02, the available information permits us to go several steps further:
*  We calculate S02  concentration in each city's atmosphere by adjusting the previous
year's concentration at .51 times the rate of change of the estimated pollution load.
This reflects the econometric result illustrated in Figure 1.
*  We substitute the estimated concentration into the dose-response function estimated
by Xu, et. al. (1994) to obtain the probability of individual  mortality from S02
pollution in a particular city.  To benchmark our estimates, we make the conservative
assumption that S02 concentrations below 30 ug/m 3 are not harmful.'8
D  We multiply the individual  mortality probability by the city's projected population to
obtain the estimated number of deaths from S02 pollution.
Our results on emissions are somewhat different for TSP and S02, reflecting the
underlying differences in their econometrically-estimated  response elasticities.  In the pure
reform ('win-win')  scenario, continued decline in the air pollution intensity of industrial
production is not enough to offset industrial growth:  Total projected S02 emissions rise
from 14.2 million  tons in 1994 to 15.7 million  tons in 2020; TSP emissions rise from 16.1
million  tons to  17.1 million tons.  In the two levy-increase scenarios, however, sharp
improvements are projected at the national level.  A 5% annual increase in the levy induces
reductions of S02 and TSP emissions to 10.3 and 7.5 million tons, respectively. When the
increase is raised to  10% annually, emissions fall to 6.9 and 3.6 million  tons, respectively.
Thus, the 10% annual levy increase is sufficient to eliminate  half of S02 emissions and
three-fourths of TSP emissions by 2020.
18 30 ug/m. 3 is the tightest S02 standard  in the world,  maintained  in Canada,  Switzerland  and Poland.
By  contrast,  the  WHO  standard  is 60, China's  standard  is 50,  and  the US  standard  is 80.
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Figure  25b: Air Pollution  Scenarios  (cont'd)
projected annual deaths from pollution-related respiratory disease increase from 3,400 to
6,400.  Shanghai's air quality deteriorates from 50 to 59;, and annual deaths rise from 700
to 1,300.  Shenyang's air quality deteriorates dramatically,  from 131 to 217, and projected
annual deaths rise from 800 to  1,500. Guangzhou's S02 concentration deteriorates from
47 to 54; deaths increase from 200 to 300.  Finally, Chongqing's slight improvement in air
quality (from 270 to 264) produces slightly lower mortality risk for a significantly  larger
population, and projected deaths rise from 4,100 to 5,000.
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Figure  25b: Air Pollution  Scenarios  (cont'd)
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Figure  25b: Air Pollution  Scenarios  (cont'd)  and Shenyang.
Finally,  we trace the projected impact of a 10% annual increase in the levy. This is
sufficient  for rough maintenance of the 1993 status quo in Shenyang and Beijing, while
Shanghai, Guangzhou and Chongqing experience strong improvements in air quality.
As Table 5.1 shows, the projected impact of levy increases on annual deaths is quite
impressive in all five cities. For the 10% levy increase, projected deaths in 2020 fall by
67% in Guangzhou, 50% in Shenyang, 47% in Beijing, 36% in Shanghai and 31% in
Chongqing.
Table 5.1:  Projected Annual Deaths from Industrial S02 Pollution 19
% Decrease
Reform Levy 5% Levy 10% for Levy 10%
Beijing  4500  3200  2400  47
Chongqing  3200  2600  2200  31
Shenyang  1200  900  600  50
Shanghai  1100  700  700  36
Guangzhou  300  200  100  67
Figure 25c displays changes in TSP loads for each city in our three scenarios. In the pure
reform scenario, we project substantial increases in emissions for Beijing, Shanghai, and
Shenyang, and rough stability in Chongqing.  For the 5% and 10% levy scenarios, the
projected trends generally replicate the sharp drop in TSP load which is projected at the
national level.  The exception is Shenyang, which experiences only a modest decline.
19 Estimated  deaths  in the preceding  paragraphs  are for total S02 pollution,  and are therefore  higher than
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lifesaving in the other cities is also counted in the thousands.
30Finally,  we should  note  that pollution-related  LivesSaved  by  502 Regulalon,  197.2020
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regulation  scenario. Figure  27 displays  the
prospects. Faced with  industrial  output
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60,000 with the 10%  annual levy increase.
Chongqing  loses over 50,000  people  in all the
scenarios;  Shenyang  and Shanghai  over 10,000.
In view of these  projected  losses, it is
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Figure  27: Cumulative  Deaths  from Air
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6.  Is Stricter Regulation Worthwhile?
Certainly, lifesaving through air pollution reduction is a laudable objective. However,
China  remains  a poor country  with many  basic  needs  unmet  for hundreds  of millions  of
citizens. Public  investment  in health  facilities  and education  can also yield  major health
benefits,  and direct  investment  in productive  capital  can improve  health  by increasing
incomes. An appropriate  welfare  analysis  of air pollution  abatement  must therefore
consider  its costs, as well  as its benefits.
Our econometric  results  show  that the cost of abating  China's  industrial  pollution  rises
steadily at the margin with degree of abatement.  At some level of abatement, further
pollution  reduction  may  no longer be warranted  because  the same  resources  could  be used
for other  investments  with greater  lifesaving  potential. Using  two cases  to illustrate  our
31approach, we address this issue with a systematic assessment of abatement benefits and  -
costs.
6.1 Case 1: Beijing
Abatement  Benefits
Beijing  had a population  of about 11,120,000  in 1993;  the mortality  rate was about
0.611%;  total deaths were about 68,000;  and  total S02 emissions  were about 366
thousand  tons (of which  204 were from industry). From this  base, a decrease  of 1,000
tons in S02 emissions  decreases  total emissions  by (1/366  * 100)%. Our econometric
results imply an associated decrease of (.51 * 1/366 * 100)% in Beijing's ambient S02
concentration. Applying the Beijing dose-response result of Xu, et. al. (1994) to the new
concentration, we obtain an estimated saving of 10.4 lives per year. Dividing both
elements by 10 yields a useful round number for policy discussion:  1 life saved per 100
tons abated  annually. This is actually  a very conservative  estimate  of potential
abatement  benefits,  since  it ignores  the likelihood  that abating  S02 has significantly  lower
lifesaving  impact  per ton than direct  abatement  of fine particulates  (including,  of course,
those  in the sulfates  associated  with S02 emissions).
How should  lifesaving  be valued  for comparison  with abatement  costs? A useful
benchmark  is provided  by the average  wage of a worker  in Beijing,  which  is approximately
$800 (6526 yuan)  per year.  A baseline  estimate  of the loss to society  when one  worker
dies  from respiratory  disease  is the presented  discounted  value of the annual  wage over a
working  lifetime. For Beijing,  this is approximately  $8,000  in present  value  terms at a
10%  discount  rate. 20 We should  stress  that it is a very partial  index  of loss, for two main
reasons. First, it takes  no account  of pain  and suffering. Secondly,  it focuses  exclusively
on mortality,  although  very  large losses are also associated  with working days  lost to non-
fatal respiratory  disease. It is a tiny figure  when compared  with statistical  life values
commonly  employed  in the OECD  countries.  21
20  This  estimate  implicitly  assumes  that  the  actual  discount  rate  in China  is higher,  and  that the
increment  is equal  to the expected  growth  rate  in real  wages  for  a currently-employed  worker.
21  For  comparison,  it is not  uncommon  to see  public  policy  decisions  in the  U.S.  reflect  'statistical  life'
values  of several  million  dollars.
32Abatement  Costs
Figure  20 illustrates  the extreme  variation  in marginal  abatement  cost by pollutant,  sector,
size class,  ownership  and degree of abatement. It clearly  makes  little sense  to talk about
abatement  costs in a general  way.  The interesting  question  for Chinese  regulators  is:
Which  facilities  should  be regulated,  and how much  abatement  is socially  desirable?
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abatement cost evidence for both pollutants in Figure 28.  The marginal abatement cost
(MAC) schedules are estimated for Beijing by combining our econometric MAC equation
xwith  current sectoral and ownership information for that city. Large plants are a major
source of air pollution in Beijing, so the MAC numbers for large facilities are particularly
interesting. We begin with the more expensive option, S02 abatement.  Our results show
that the MAC curve  for 100  tons of S02 abatement by large plants in Beijing varies from
about $2,900 at 15%  abatement  to $27,000  at 85%.22  In Figure 28(a), the MAC curve
for large plants  crosses  the $8,000  incremental  benefit  line  at around 60% abatement;  by
implication, the MAC curve for non-SOGE  large plants would cross the incremental benefit
line at a much higher abatement level.  The MAC schedule for small  facilities crosses the
incremental  benefit  line  at around 15%  abatement.
For particulates,  the numbers  are much  more attractive: MAC  scarcely  rises above $500
for 100 tons abated, even at 85% abatement for small  plants. Costs are substantially  less
for large  facilities. MAC  estimates  for our other  four cities  differ  somewhat,  but have  the
same order of magnitude. A-useful contrast is provided by NEPA's current  estimates  of
actual abatement in the five cities, displayed in Table 5.2
22  We should note that this MAC curve  is an average  which reflects  the distribution  of production  between
SOE  and non-SOE  plants in Beijing.  As we have seen,  the MAC schedule  for non-SQE  plants is always
far lower  than the SOE  schedule. A targeted  regulatory  strategy  could,  of course,  exploit  this difference  to
capture  the largest returns  from stricter  enforcement  for the least-cost  plants.
33According to NEPA, Beijing's current abatement rate for industrial S02 is 2.5%.  For a
conservative benefit-cost assessment, we adopt the lowest rate of abatement -- 15% --
which has been included in Figure 28.  At 15% abatement, we estimate the incremental
cost of 100 tons of S02 abatement to be $2,860.  Taking this to be the incremental cost
of saving a life, we use our estimated incremental lifesaving benefit ($8,000) to calculate a
social rate of return to abatement of approximately 180%.
Table 5.2:  Industrial S02 Abatement in Five Cities
. S02  S02  Abatement
Produced  Emitted  %
Shenyang  196,100  144,700  26.2
Shanghai  393,700  356,700  9.4
Chongqing  544,800  494,800  L  9.2
Guangzhou  165,100  151,500  8.2
Beijing  208,900  203,700  2.5
We should stress that this estimated rate of return, while clearly attractive, is extremely
conservative as a guide to the lifesaving value of air pollution abatement in Beijing.  For a
large, non-SOE plant, our econometric results imply a MAC of $332 for 100 tons of S02
abated when the abatement rate is 10%. The equivalent figure for 100 tons of particulates
abated is around $120.  If (as seems likely, given overall abatement rate of 2.5%) there are
large non-SOE plants in Beijing which are abating at less than 10%, then failure to
enforce greater abatement is equivalent to valuing a Beijing worker's life at less
than $500.  Continued inaction means ignoring a public investment with whose
social rate of return is likely to be in excess of 3,000%!  We believe that the
opportunities for such high returns may be quite rare in China's urban health
sector.
We conclude that it would make extremely good economic sense to tighten air pollution
control in Beijing.  Our abatement cost estimates show that it would also be sensible  to
focus on particulate emissions from large facilities.
6.2  Case 2:  Zhengzhou
Our results for Beijing do not necessarily yield appropriate conclusions  for other urban
areas in China.  In the first place, our cost analysis  reflects only microeconometric
evidence on marginal abatement costs (MAC) for end-of-pipe treatment.  These almost
certainly overstate overall MAC, because process changes often provide the least-cost
abatement opportunities for industrial facilities.  Secondly, Beijing is not a representative
Chinese city for environmental analysis.  It is extremely large, and considerably more
polluted than the average large urban area in China.
Our second case is designed to address both of these problems. For the abatement cost
analysis,  we use our cross-provincial econometric results on pollution intensities because
they incorporate all abatement options available  to Chinese factories.  Our focal city is
34Zhengzhou,  the capital  of Henan  Province,  which  we have  chosen  because  its population,
income  and air pollution  level are representative  for China's  large cities.  2 3Zhengzhou's
industry  pours approximately  45,000  tons of S02 into the atmosphere  every  year,
contributing to an ambient S02 concentration of 90 ug/m 3 . At this level of air pollution,
Xu's dose-response  function  predicts  that over 400 people are dying  annually  from S02-
related  pollution. Thousands  more are undoubtedly  suffering  from serious  respiratory
illness.
Because  Zhengzhou  is a representative  large city,  we use it to develop  an estimate  of the
optimum  air pollution  levy  for urban China. The optimum  levy  should  be set at the point
where  the incremental  benefit  of abatement  is equal  to its incremental  cost. To identify
this point,  we simulate  pollution  control  alternatives  by reducing  Zhengzhou's  S02
emissions  in 10%  increments  until 90% abatement  is reached. We follow  the method  used
for Beijing  to estimate  reductions  in atmospheric  S02 concentration  and  mortality  from
respiratory  disease. We value  mortality  reductions  at $8,000  per 'statistical  life,' yielding
the marginal  benefit  (MB) schedule  in Figure  29.
To estimate  the marginal  cost (MC)  schedule,  we turn to our cross-provincial  econometric
results  for the S02-intensity  of industrial  production. The levy  response  elasticity  in this
equation  (which  is always  estimated  with the appropriate  sign  and  high statistical
significance)  registers  the overall  result  when enterprise  managers  weigh  incremental  levy
payments  for pollution  against  the incremental  cost of abatement.  At the equilibrium  level
of pollution  intensity,  the effective  levy  rate should  be just equal  to the incremental  cost of
abatement  for industry  as a whole,  whether  the abatement  is achieved  by process change
or installation  of end-of-pipe  treatment. Solving  the estimated  S02 intensity  equation  'in
reverse' for the effective  levy  rate (or, in equilibrium,  the incremental  cost of abatement),
we obtain  an expression  for incremental  abatement  cost as a function  of industrial  S02
intensity. We have  plotted  this MAC  schedule  in Figure  29.
23 Zhengzhou's  1993 population was 1.8 million;  it average industrial wage was 3,350 RMBIyear.
35The Optimum Air Pollution Levy in Zhengzhou
Our results  for Zhengzhou  suggest  that  Adil  302  At.t1mnt  in  mungzhcu:
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should be far stricter.  At the city's  140.
current atmospheric S02 concentration,  120
abating  a ton of S02 will save  about
.63% of a 'statistical  life,' yielding  a
benefit of approximately $50.  By
contrast,  we estimate  the incremental
cost of abating  one ton at the current  -
emissions  level (represented  by the zero  ot  s  '  2  2
point in Figure  29) to be approximately  Aimmt%
$1.70.  Clearly,  there is huge social  Figure  29: The Optimum  Air Pollution  Levy  in
'profit' to be made  by abating  more  Zhengzhou
pollution. As the graph  shows, additional  abatement  remains  socially  profitable  at the
margin  until about  73% of current  emissions  are eliminated. The levy  which  will induce
this reduction  is about $90/ton,  at the intersection  of the marginal  benefit  and cost curves.
This is our estimate  of the optimum industrial air pollution levy for Zhengzhou,  since  a
lower  levy  would  leave  socially  profitable  abatement  opportunities  unexploited,  and a
higher  levy  would  impose  an abatement  cost higher  than the social  gain  from further
pollution  reduction.
Implications for China
According  to our results,  the current  levy  in Zhengzhou  makes sense  only if China's
policymakers  value  the life of an average  urban  resident  at approximately  $270
($1.70/.00625).  This figure  seems  tragically  low  when compared  to the loss of a life,  with
the associated  pain,  suffering,  and elimination  of a lifetime's  contribution  to China's
economic  output.  Even our suggested  statistical  life  value,  $8,000,  is a very conservative
number  which  only  takes account  of economic  output  foregone. But to meet even  this
conservative standard,  our result suggests that the air pollution levy should be
increased  more  than fiftyfold  in Zhengzhou  - and,  by implication,  in the rest of urban
China.  The optimum rate -- $90/ton -- is not exceptionally  high by industrial-economy
standards  (e.g., $130/ton  for tradable  S02 permits  in the US (1995); an emissions  charge
of $72/ton  in Poland (1993),  and $29/ton  in France  (1992)).  However,  China  is much
poorer than  any of these  countries. The optimal  levy  for Zhengzhou  (and,  by implication,
for the rest of urban China)  is so high  because  current  air pollution  is so bad  - arguably
the worst in the world
Revenue Implications
The purpose  of the levy  is to reduce  pollution,  but it generates  public  revenue  as well.  If
Zhengzhou's  environmental  regulators  increased  the air  pollution  levy  to $90/ton,  the
city's annual  revenue  from air  pollution  charges  would  be approximately  $1.1 million
36($90/ton,x 12,500 tons after the 73% reduction).  For all of China's large cities, scaling
up the Zhengzhou result for a charge of $90/ton yields a revenue estimate of
approximately $250 million  - a substantial sum, but only a small fraction of the levy's
value as a lifesaving policy tool.
7.  Keys to The Future
Our analysis suggests that well-designed policies can substantially  improve China's  urban
environment, and that the associated costs are well worth incurring. We can summarize
the keys to effective policy in the following propositions:
*  Continued  economic  reform  is necessary  to preserve  past environmental  gains.
Our research has demonstrated the powerful impact of the reforms on the air and
water pollution intensity of Chinese industry. Reform-induced changes in sectoral
composition, ownership and scale of production have been sufficient to compensate
for much of the increase in scale of output during the past decade.  Our projections
show that continuation of the reforms can have similar mitigating effects during the
coming decades.  Rapid industrial growth without further changes in ownership and
production scale would produce far greater pollution loads than those contemplated in
this study.
D  Pollution levy reform would be a very cost-effective investment in public health.
In this paper, we focus on the consequences of strengthening the pollution levy
system.  Our results suggest that a much higher air pollution levy would save lives very
cost-effectively  in urban China. However, we would also recommend certain changes
in the design of the levy system. Water pollution levies are assessed only on 'above-
standard' discharges, making emissions 'free' for polluters until the standards are
reached.  The air pollution levy is assessed on the total volume of air pollutants, but it
is not fully adjusted for individual  pollutants according to relative risk.  For both air
and water emissions, it would be sensible to consider adoption of a complete charge
system which would be targeted on specific pollutants and assessed on all units of
pollution.  Recent research on the water pollution levy (Dasgupta, Huq, Wheeler and
Zhang, 1996) has demonstrated that a revised system could be considerably more cost-
effective.
*  Enforcement  should  be targeted  on low-cost  sources.
The cost analysis  in this paper shows why targeting is a good idea:  Large polluters are
easier to monitor, and have far lower unit abatement costs.  The key to cost-effective
reduction of industrial pollution in China's cities is targeted enforcement of higher
abatement standards for large facilities.
37*  Township-Village Industrial Enterprises (TVEE's)  should be fully integrated into
the regulatory system.
Our results show that stronger regulation has produced significant  reduction of
industrial pollution in China. However, many TVIE's remain outside the current
sphere of regulation.  Pollution from TVIE's is a 'dark star'  on China's horizon: It is
growing rapidly, but currently-available  information is insufficient  to judge the
consequences.  Inclusion of major TVIE pollution sources should be a priority for
China's regulators during the coming decade.
*  Rapid development will promote stricter pollution control.
In the long run, this may be the most important factor of all. Recent research has
shown that the strength of regulation in China's provinces is heavily affected by their
levels of social and economic development.  Poor communities with low education
levels are far less able to promote their environmental interests than their more highly-
developed counterparts.  Ultimately, China's environmental interests will be best
served by rapid economic development, coupled with concerted efforts to inform and
empower poorer communities.
S. Conclusions
China's industrial growth in the era of reform is a remarkable success story, but it has been
clouded by serious pollution damage. Hundreds of thousands of people are suffering
premature death or serious respiratory illness from exposure to industrial air pollution.
Many of China's waterways are seriously contaminated by industrial discharges, rendering
them largely unfit for direct human use.  However, China's own experience during the past
decade shows that this damage can be substantially  reduced at modest cost.  Much
potential damage has been avoided already, through the impact of China's economic
reform policies on industry, and the specific effect of stricter regulation in some polluted
areas.  Together, these policies have lowered industry's pollution intensity sufficiently  to
reduce organic water pollution in many areas, and to curb the growth of air pollution in
the face of rapid industrial growth.
Despite this encouraging progress, a conservative assessment of the benefits and costs of
further air pollution abatement suggests that much higher levels of particulate and S02
emissions control are warranted in China's polluted cities. For our analysis,  we have
developed three scenarios which project pollution damage under varying assumptions
about future policies.  Even if regulation is not tightened further, we find that continued
economic reform should have a powerful effect on pollution intensity. Organic water
pollution will stabilize  in many areas, and actually decline in some.  Air pollution will
continue growing in most areas, but at a much slower pace than industrial output.
38However,  our projections  also  highlight  the unnecessarily  high cost of regulatory  inaction.
If economic  reform  is not supplemented  by tighter  regulation,  most of China's  waterways
will remain  heavily  polluted  and many  thousands  of people  will die or suffer  serious
respiratory  damage  from air pollution. Continuing  recent  trends  in tightened  regulation
for water pollution  will  result  in sharp improvements;  adopting  an economically-feasible
policy  of much  stricter  regulation  will  restore  the health  of many  waterways. In the case
of air pollution,  the stakes  are even  higher  because  regulatory  enforcement  has apparently
weakened  in many  areas during  the past half-decade. Reversal  of this trend will  save
many  lives  at extremely  modest  cost. Adoption  of NEPA's recent recommendation  for a
tenfold  increase  in the air pollution  levy  would  produce  a major  turnaround  in most cities,
and our results suggest  that even  NEPA's recommendation  is very conservative.  For a
representative  Chinese  city,  Zhengzhou,  we find  that a fiftyfold  increase  in the levy
appears  warranted  from an economic  perspective.
Finally,  our microeconomic  analysis  of abatement  alternatives  has highlighted  the cost-
effectiveness  of a pollution  control  policy  targeted  on large sources  of particulate  and S02
emissions. Abatement  of particulates  from  large non-SOE  plants  is so cheap that even  an
extremely  conservative  economic  analysis  affrms the benefits  of very high  abatement
levels. Our analysis  suggests  that high social  rates of return can be obtained  from
regulation  which  induces  at least 70% abatement  of S02 and even  greater abatement  of
particulates  from  large urban  industrial  facilities.  At present,  lax regulation  of such
facilities  is causing  so much  health  damage  that reform  seems  imperative. Inaction
amounts  to valuing  a Chinese  worker's life at less  than $US 500, a figure  which  is
tragically  low  by any standard.
39References
Afsah, Shakeb, Benoit Laplante and David Wheeler, "Controlling Industrial Pollution: A
New Paradigm," 1996, World Bank, Policy Research Department Working Paper,
November
Dasgupta, Susmita, Mainul Huq, David Wheeler and C.H. Zhang, 1996, "Water Pollution
Abatement by Chinese Industry: Cost Estimates and Policy Implications," World Bank
Policy Research Department Working Paper No. 1630, August
Dasgupta, Susmita and David Wheeler, "Citizen Complaints as Environmental Indicators:
Evidence from China," 1996, World Bank Policy Research Department Working
Paper, December
Dasgupta, Susmita, Mainul Huq and David Wheeler, "Bending the Rules: Determinants of
Discretionary Pollution Control in China," 1997, World Bank Policy Research
Department Working Paper, January
Hartman, Raymond, Mainul Huq and David Wheeler, 1996, "Why Paper Mills Clean Up:
Survey Evidence From Four Asian Countries," World Bank Policy Research
Department Working Paper, December
Hettige, Mala, Paul Martin, Manjula Singh and David Wheeler, 1995,  "IPPS: The
Industrial Pollution Projection System," World Bank Policy Research Department
Working Paper, February
Hettige, Mala, Mainul  Huq, Sheoli  Pargal and David Wheeler, 1996, "Determinants  of
Pollution  Abatement  in Developing  Countries:  Evidence  from South and Southeast  Asia,"
World Development,  December
Mani, Muthukumara and David Wheeler, 1997, "In Search of Pollution Havens? Dirty
Industry in the World Economy, 1960-1995," World Bank Policy Research
Department Working Paper (forthcoming)
Martin, Paul, Mainul Huq and David Wheeler, "Process Change, Economic Policy, and
Industrial Pollution: Cross Country Evidence from the Wood Pulp and Steel Industries,"
paper presented at the Annual Meetings, American Economic Association, Anaheim,
California, January 1993
Lucas, Robert, 1996, "Environmental Regulation and the Location of Polluting Industry
in China," World Bank, Policy Research Dept. (mimeo.)
Pargal, Sheoli and David Wheeler, 1996, "Informal  Regulation  of Industrial  Pollution  in
Developing  Countries:  Evidence  from Indonesia,"  Journal of Political  Economy,  December
40Xu, Xiping, J. Gao, D. Dockery and Y. Chen, 1994, "Air Pollution and Daily
Mortality in Residential Areas of Beijing, China," Archives of Environmental
Health, 49(4), 216-22
Xu, Z.Y., X. Xu, C.H. Chen,  T. Kjellstrom,  et. al., 1995, "Air  Pollution  and Daily
Mortality in Shenyang" (mimeo.)
Wang, Hua and David Wheeler, 1996, "Pricing Industrial Pollution in China: An
Econometric Analysis of the Levy System," World Bank Policy Research Department
Working Paper No. 1644, September
Wheeler, David, 1991, "The Economics of Industrial Pollution Control: An International
Perspective," World Bank Industry and Energy Department Working Paper No. 60,
January
41Appendix
This  Appendix  describes  the econometric  equations  which  have  been  used for the
simulations  in the paper. Most of our information  has been  made available  by NEPA and
the Tianjin  Environmental  Protection  Bureau,  either  as databases  from the agencies'
internal  files  or, in the case of NEPA, in published  Environmental  Yearbooks. Some
additional  information  has been  drawn  from the National  Industrial  Yearbooks.
A.1  Regulation  of Industrial Water Pollution'
Our COD intensity  equation is based on an analysis  of the regulatory experience  of 29 Chinese
provinces  during  the period 1987-93. For this analysis,  we used a structural model  to
investigate  the sources of covariation  in water pollution  intensity  (provincial  COD
emissions/output)  and the effective water pollution levy  rate (actual collections  per unit of
above-standard  wastewater discharge).
Our estimation exercise was based on a model of 'equilibrium pollution':  In each region
and period, the effective levy rate (or 'price of pollution') and pollutant discharge are
jointly determined by the intersection of environmental demand (ED) and supply (ES)
functions. The ED function relates industrial pollution intensity to the local price of
pollution.  It reflects the economics of cost-minimizing  abatement by industry, and is
formally equivalent to the marginal abatement cost (MAC) function in textbooks of
environmental economics. The ES function specifies the pollution price imposed by the
community  as damage rises. While it reflects considerations of marginal social damage
(MSD), ES is not equivalent to the textbook MSD function because it reflects the
interplay of limited information, perceived self-interest, and differential ability or
willingness  to enforce community standards. Equilibrium pollution  (at the intersection of
ED and ES) is therefore not necessarily optimalpollution  (at the intersection of ED and
MSD).
In modeling  environmental  supply,  we focused  particularly  on the role of endogenous
enforcement.  Across  provinces,  regulators  may  differ  greatly  in their ability  or willingness
to enforce  the formal  regulations. In practice,  regulation  is almost  never a 'pure'
administrative process in which violations are unambiguously observed and rules are
uniformly enforced. Because industry is a prime generator of income and employment,
regulatory enforcement is often subjected to political pressure for leniency. 2 Even when
they are unencumbered, regulators are generally reluctant to impose penalties which will
bankrupt or shut down factories.  They may, however, be tougher in relatively affluent
regions where communities put more stress on environmental quality.
Environmental demand reflects the price of pollution, but it also may be affected by plant,
firm and industry characteristics. We used output shares by sector to control for sectoral
differences in pollution intensity.  The estimated effect of provincial differences in sector
1 For a more detailed discussion, see Wang and Wheeler (1996).
2  See Wheeler (1991).
42shares will depend on the degree to which sectoral regulatory standards adjust for
differences in sectoral wastewater intensities, influent intensities and abatement costs.  If
there is full adjustment (i.e., proportionately lower standards for wastewater- and influent-
intensive sectors with high abatement costs; higher standards for the opposite case),
sectoral shares will have no independent effect.
Plant size is another potentially-important determinant of pollution intensity. However,
while abatement scale economies are clearly present at the plant level, they do not affect
province-level aggregates. Therefore, we could not use provincial industrial output to
capture scale effects. However, the available data do distinguish  between production from
small, medium and large industrial facilities. We therefore controlled for this factor by
introducing the share of provincial output produced by large plants.
We also controlled for state ownership, since several considerations suggest that state-
owned plants may be more pollution intensive than other facilities. First, state-owned
factories may simply  generate more waste residuals per unit of output because they are
less efficient.  Secondly, soft budget constraints may make them less sensitive to pollution
levies. Finally, evidence from other Asian countries suggests that state-owned factories
resist regulation more successfully  than privately-owned plants (Pargal and Wheeler, 1996;
Hettige, Huq, Pargal and Wheeler (1996), Hartman, Huq and Wheeler, 1996). We
controlled for this factor by introducing the provincial share of production in state-owned
factories.
After these adjustments, the estimation equation for the cross-provincial data set is as
follows (for the rth province):
N
(1.1)  logCODI,  =aO  +alkskr  +aLLARGEr  +aGSTATEr+aplogPL  Wr  +6r
j=1
Prior expectations: aL  <  0,  aG  >  0,  ap <  0
where
CODI  =  COD intensity (COD discharge / Industrial output)
skr  =  The industrial  output  share of the kth sector
LARGEr  =  The industrial output share of large plants
STATE,  =  The industrial output share of state-owned plants
PLWr  =  Effective pollution levy per unit of excess wastewater discharge
Sr  =  A stochastic error term incorporating provincial components
On the supply side, we have measures for the relevant variables at the provincial level. The
appropriate estimating equation is therefore specified as follows:
43log  PLW, = log  POPD, +log(eo) 1o0)+(,o1 - l)logCODD, +Cv2  logINC,
(1.2)  +  0 31og  IND,  +  v,
Prior expectations: D > 1 (G)l  - I >  0),  )2 >  0,  03 > 0
where
PLWr  =  Effective  pollution  levy  per unit of excess  wastewater  discharge
CODDr  =  COD emissions per unit of provincial land area (or pollution density)
POPDr  =  Provincial population density
INCr  =  Provincial  income  per capita
INDr  = Industry  share  of provincial  output (a proxy for local bargaining
power)
Vr  = A stochastic  error term  incorporating  provincial  components
In equations  (1.1 - 1.2),  PLW  and CODI are  jointly  determined.  In addition,  the error
terms  in both equations  are likely  to incorporate  provincial  fixed  effects. We have
therefore  estimated  the two equations  using  two-stage  least squares  and the appropriate
error components  model. The use of fixed-effects  also permitted  us to control  for
institutional  and historical  factors  which  may  affect  industrial  pollution  intensities  and
regulatory  enforcement  practices  across  China's  provinces.
Our results for COD  intensity  are reported in Table  A.  1  a.  The elasticity  of COD  intensity
with respect to the effective  water pollution  levy  is quite high (-.8);  state-owned
enterprises  have significantly  higher  COD  intensities,  while  large plants  have  lower ones.
After  these factors  are accounted  for, a few sectors  have  exceptionally  high or low COD
intensities. COD  intensity  in the power sector  is significantly  lower  than average,  while
higher-than-average  intensities  characterize  metals,  coal  mining,  building  material  mining,
chemical  fiber  production  and transportation  equipment  manufacturing.
The results  for the effective  water pollution  levy  are reported  in Table  A.  lb.  Collinearity
is clearly  a problem,  but the results  suggest  that pollution  load, exposed  population  and
provincial  development  level all affect  the 'price of pollution.'
44Table A.1:  COD Intensity and the Effective Water Pollution Levy
(a) COD Intensity Equation
Dependent Variable: Log COD Intensity
Independent Variable  Coefficients
(t-ratio)
Log Effective Levy  -0.835
(-3.785)
State Enterprise Share  1.832
(2.726)
Large Plant Share  -3.921
(-5.600)
Sector Shares




Coal Mining  10.899
(2.527)
Building Material Mining  12.109
(2.383)
Chemical Fibers  9.763
(2.472)
Transport Equipment  4.834
(2.187)
Adjusted R2  0.819
(b) Effective Water Pollution Levy Equation
Dependent Variable: Log (Effective COD
Levy)
Independent Variable  Coefficients
(t-rati_)
Log COD Density  0.127
(1.342)
Log Pop. Density  2.44
(2.630)
Log Income Per Capita  0.342
(1.259)
Log Industry Share  0.242
(0.863)
Adjusted R2  0.794
45A.2  Regulation of Industrial Air Pollution
As noted in the paper, our results for the effective air pollution levy are different from
those for water in one important respect:  We find no evidence that the air levy is jointly
determined with industrial air pollution intensity;  nor do we find any evidence that
measures of exposed population or provincial development have a significant  impact on
the levy. We therefore report only the air pollution intensity equations which have been
used for the simulation  work in this paper.
The estimation equation for the cross-provincial data set is as follows (for the rth
province):
N
(1.3)  logAIRPr =  a.+Y Eaksks  +  LARGEr + a±STATEr+ap logPLW,  +  er
j=1
Prior expectations:  aL < 0 ,  aG > 0,  ap <  0
where
AIiRI  =  Air pollution intensity (discharge / industrial output)
Sk,  =  The industrial output share of the kth sector
LARGEr  =  The industrial output share of large plants
STATEr  =  The industrial output share of state-owned plants
PLA,  =  Effective air pollution levy per unit of pollutant discharge
e.r  =  A stochastic  error  term incorporating  provincial  components
As in the case of water pollution, the use of provincial fixed-effects  has permitted us to
control for institutional and historical factors which may affect air pollution intensities
across China's provinces. Results are reported in Table A.2 (a,b)
46Table  A.2: Air Pollution  Intensity  Equations
Log S02 Intensity  Log Smoke  Intensity  Log  Dust Intensity
Variables  Coefficients  Variables  Coefficients  Variables  Coefficients
(t-ratios)  (t-ratios)  (t-ratios)
Log  Effective  Levy  -0.321  Log Effective  Levy  -0.796  Log Effective  Levy  -0.434
(-1.528)  (-3.433)  (-1.646)
State  Enterprise  Share  1.859  State  Enterprise  3.126  STATE  2.298
(3.374)  Share  (5.094)  (4.054)
Log Large  Plant Share  -3.921  Large  Plant Share  -2.514  LARGE  -6.458
(-8.083)  (-3.538)  (-6.151)
Sector Shares
Non-Ferrous  Metals  12.652  Metal  Products  8.707  Electrical  Equipment  6.528
(3.592)  (1.684)  (1.627)
Ferrous  Metals  Mining  7.906  Paper  16.839  Building  Materials  -14.787
(1.708)  (2.587)  Mining  (-2.485)
Petroleum  and Nat.  4.001  Ferrous  Metals  10.224  Ferrous  Metals  1.794
Gas Extraction  (1.612)  Mining  (1.969)  Smelting  (1.631)
Education,  Sports  -35.559  Education,  Sports  -53.599  Textiles  4.505
Products  (-2.553)  Products  (-3.504)  (2.253)
Furniture  48.230  Logging  and Timber  9.734
(2.203)  Transport  (2.714)
Adjusted  R2  0.880  Adjusted  R2  0.889  Adjusted  R2  0.857
The results on air pollution intensity are quite similar, although the estimated elasticities
differ across equations.  Elasticities of response to the effective air levy are -.3 for S02,
-.8 for smoke, and -.4 for dust.  In all three cases, state enterprises are significantly  more
pollution intensive and large plants significantly  less so.  Sectors with unusually large or
small pollution intensity differ somewhat across the three equations.
A.3  Determinants of S02  Concentration Across Chinese Cities
Simulation  of future  health impacts  requires  translating  projected  air pollutant  emissions
into atmospheric concentrations. In the case of S02, we were able to fit an econometric
equation to data from major Chinese cities during the period 1991-1993.  The results,
reported in Table A.3, describe the relationship  between total S02 emissions and
atmospheric S02 concentration, controlling for temperature and precipitation. We find no
significant  impact for temperature, but the results show that cities with higher precipitation
have markedly lower atmospheric S02 concentrations, controlling for the level of S02
emissions. The impact of emissions on atmospheric concentration is highly significant  in
both equations, with an estimated elasticity of .51.




Log S02 Density  0.513  0.508
(4.866)  (4.976)
Log Temperature  -0.061
(-04201)
Log Precipitation  -0.325  -0.352
(-1.645)  (-2.481)
Constant  4.718  4.759
(4.866)  (5.068
Adjusted R2  0.290  0.302
A.4  The Cost of Air and Water Pollution Abatement 3
Using large plant-level databases provided by NEPA and the Tianjin EPB for 1993, we
have analyzed end-of-pipe abatement costs for major air and water pollutants.  Our
estimation exercise reflects both economic and engineering considerations in abatement.
From an economic perspective, industrial facilities can abate pollution by scaling back
polluting activities or by diverting resources to cleanup.  In either case, pollution reduction
will entail costs. Moreover, diminishing  returns apply; more resources have to be devoted
to cleaning  up each additional unit of pollutant.  Hence, industry's marginal abatement
cost (MAC) function slopes upward from right to left as pollution falls.
The engineering literature identifies  four major factors which determine the cost of
abatement: Pollutant type, diversity of emission sources, scale of abatement, and pollutant
concentration in the waste stream. Generally then, the position and slope of the MAC
function are affected by factors such as the scale and sectoral composition of production:
the average operating efficiency of the firm; the available process technologies; and the
efficiency  of waste treatment technologies. For any given level of pollution, more costly
pollution control is associated with rightward movement of the MAC function.
Abatement processes frequently reduce more than one air or water pollutant, so joint cost
function estimation is appropriate. For example, stack scrubbers remove both Total
Suspended Particulates (TSP) and Sulfur dioxide (S02 ) from waste gas;  Biological
Oxygen Demand (BOD), Chemical Oxygen Demand (COD), and Suspended Solids (TSS)
can all be removed from waste water in common facilities. These joint equipment
requirements are associated with common use of skilled and unskilled labor, energy and
materials.
3  For a more detailed  discussion,  see Dasgupta,  Huq  and Wheeler  (1996).
48Assuming that the abatement cost function is separable from the firm's production cost
function, reflecting purely end-of-pipe activity, our regression model for joint abatement
of k pollutants is specified as a second-order quadratic approximation to the general cost
function (or translog function):
W  2  l  V  (E-9N  (E
In Ci= ao+  a, in Wi  + a1 in  Wi  + ,Y  In  +Z  lng  In  j  In Wi
(1.4)
N  N  E  1  E  +  + +  ir  ij  ln (  I-)ln  - +  jJIn  )  +  0mXIm  +
j--1  k--l  Ijik  i  =
where
Cj:  Total annual cost of end-of-pipe abatement for the plant i
Wi:  Total annual wastewater or waste gas volume
Ej/Ij:  Vector of effluent/influent  ratios for n pollutants, which can be interpreted either as
concentration ratios or volume ratios (since waste water or gas volume is constant
across influent and effluent for each plant, it cancels out of the concentration
ratio).
Xm:  Vector of relevant plant characteristics (sector, age, ownership)
s i  Vector of random disturbances. 4
Abatement in Equation (1.4) is measured by E/I, which reflects the percent reduction in
the pollutant as it passes from pre-abatement influent concentration I to post-abatement
effluent concentration E.
We have estimated (1.4) for four water pollutants (BOD, COD, TSS, and other
pollutants); and two air pollutants (TSP, S02).  Our data are from the China
Environmental Monitoring Station in Beijing, which monitors the 3000 factories currently
rated as China's largest potential polluters.  For this exercise China's National
Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA) provided us with 1993 data for approximately
1000 factories. 5
Testing alternative nested specifications of the cost function (1.4), we have found that we
cannot reject the restrictions associated with a constant-elasticity (log-log) model for
water, and a log-log model with quadratic scale effects for air. In order to control for
4  An appropriate  cost  function  should  include  a vector  of input  prices at the location of plant i; but we
exclude  input  prices, since  cross-regional  price indices  are not presently  available  to us.
5  These  factories  are scattered  across  China's urban/industrial  areas. Many  facilities  have multiple
emission  sources.  The database  includes  information  on treatment,  emissions  by pollutant,  abatement,  and
abatement  costs  for each emission  source.
49potential  simultaneity  in the joint determination  of emissions  and abatement  costs6,  we
have estimated  the equations  using two-stage  least squares. 7
Regression  results are reported  in Table  A.4. In the regressions,  all the key parameters
have the expected  signs  and high  levels  of statistical  significance.  The marginal  cost of
abatement  rises significantly  with degree  of abatement  (measured  in inverse  form by the
effluent/influent  ratios  for pollutants),  and marginal  cost schedules  vary considerably  by
pollutant. Significant  scale  economies  are observed  in both cases  (e.g. for water, the
elasticity  of total cost with respect  to scale  is .41: When  scale  increases  by 1%,  total cost
increases  by .41%).
Abatement  costs differ  significantly  by sector. After controlling  for scale  and degree  of
abatement,  oil refining  is relatively  high cost and  food processing  is relatively  low cost for
water pollution  abatement.  On the other hand chemicals,  oil  refining  and non-ferrous
metals  processing  are relatively  high cost, and cement  is relatively  low cost, for air
pollution  abatement.
We have also  tested for the impact  of plant age and ownership  on abatement  costs, with
mixed  results. Neither  state ownership  nor age has a significant  impact  on the cost of
water abatement. Age is insignificant  for air  pollution  abatement  cost as well,  but state-
owned  enterprises  do have significantly  higher  abatement  costs after controlling  for other
factors.
6  Since  these  two  variables  are theoretically  jointly-determined  in the cost  mninimization  exercise  of the
plant, the abatement  parameter  estimates  of ordinary  least squares  may  be biased.
7  In the first stage  regressions,  discharge  of each pollutant  (the numerator  of EA) is regressed  on total
plant employment,  treatment  scale,  influent  volume  for the pollutant,  age of plant, a dummy  variable  for
state ownership,  and the relevant  sectoral  standard,  depending  on data availability.
50Table A.4: Abatement Cost Function Estimation Results
Variable Descriptions:
Water:
LTRTW  = Log (Volume of Wastewater Treated)
LTSS  = Log (Effluent/Influent) for Total Suspended Solids
LCOD  = Log (Effluent/Influent) for Chemical Oxygen Demand
LBOD  = Log (Effluent/Influent) for Biological Oxygen Demand
LOTH  = Log (Effluent/Influent) for other water pollutants
Air:
LTRTWG  = Log (Volume of Waste Gas Treated)
LTSP  = Log (Effluent/Influent)  for Pollutants other than S02 (principally TSP)
LS02 = Log (Effluent/Influent)  for S02
Water Pollutants  Air Pollutants
Coefficient  I  Coefficient  t
Intercept  4.4692  22.508  Intercept  8.6810  3.375
LTRTW  0.4081  27.920  LTRTG  -0.5528  -1.808
LTSS  -0.0530  -2.487  LTRTG*LTRTG  0.0269  2.960
LCOD  -0.1464  -4.402  LS02 -0.2642  -3.925
LBOD  -0.2208  -3.722  LTSP  -0.1128  -3.037
LOTH  -0.1025  -6.303  Chemicals  0.5823  2.586
Food  -0.7403  -4.285  Cement  -1.5781  -5.958
Textiles  0.3202  2.377  Oil Refining  1.5269  3.889
Oil Refining  1.6723  10.032  Non-Ferrous  1.1134  3.525
Metals
Chemicals  0.1589  1.797  State-Owned  1.6509  4.030
Adjusted R 2 0.32  Adjusted R 2 0.47
No. of  2221  No. of  284
Observations  Observations
From the log-log form of equation (1.4), with potential quadratic scale effects, we have
derived the following plant-level total and marginal cost equations:
(1.5) C-  eazW'a1+a21ogw  Ei6-]
51(1.6)  =  eao  l  ]
iEk  El,  i=' LJ
In the paper, we draw on equation (1.6) to estimate marginal costs of pollution abatement
(in annual dollars/ton) by pollutant, for plants of different ownership categories in different
sectors and size classes. s
8  Note  that a2 =  0 for water  abatement.
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